by Gerald Therrien
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 3.
The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, 1786 – 1796.
During the American Revolution, when General Washington had asked General Wayne to undertake an extremely perilous enterprise – the storming of Stony Point, Wayne replied : “General, I will storm Hell, if you will only plan it.”
Part 3 – Peace on the Frontier
Chapter 21 – Jay’s Mission to London, August 19th 1794
President Washington now was faced with the possibility of provoking a war against Great Britain, or with finding an alternative path that would keep the young fledgling republic safe.
Chief Justice John Jay, by Gilbert Stuart (1794)
On December 2nd 1793, the Third Session of the United States Congress opened. On December 4th, the Senate received from President Washington, all of the papers, instructions, journals and correspondence relating to the negotiations that the executive had been conducting, between the sessions of Congress, with the hostile Indians and the failure to reach a peaceable settlement.
On December 5th, President Washington placed before them the full correspondence between the United States and Great Britain and France, regarding neutral rights – including the dismissal of Genet, and the state of negotiation with Britain over the issues arising from the 1783 treaty of peace – showing Britain’s disinclination to continue the negotiation or at any time to evacuate the posts.
As he had earlier informed President Washington, Thomas Jefferson resigned as Secretary of State in President Washington’s cabinet and left office on December 31st. However, before he left, Jefferson submitted to Congress, on December 16th, his long-delayed report (from 1791) on the restrictions and discriminations by foreign nations against the commerce of the United States, especially the results of British tariff and navigation laws. Hamilton said that he ‘threw this firebrand of discord’ into the Congress and then ‘instantly decamped for Monticello’.
Jefferson’s report was considered by a Committee of the Whole in the House on January 1st 1794. Madison now re-introduced his 1791 resolutions calling for reciprocal duties and restrictions on foreign shipping. And, a report prepared by Hamilton, that was also written in 1791 – to oppose Jefferson’s report, was now given to Congressman William Smith, from South Carolina, who fashioned from it the opposition to Madison’s resolutions.
Note: Madison had first introduced these resolutions in February 1791, after the failure of the Morris mission to London, and it was at this time, that Jefferson had initially prepared his report. But, following reports that a British minister to the United States was to be appointed, Madison dropped his resolutions, and Jefferson’s report was pigeon-holed, in hope that something might come out of the negotiations with George Hammond, the new minister. And also, back in 1791, Hamilton had prepared a report intended to controvert the conclusions anticipated from Jefferson’s report, and as long as Jefferson’s report was held back, so was Hamilton’s report.
Congressman Smith compared the 12 leading trade goods of the United States – flour, tobacco, rice, wood, fish, potash, salted meat, indigo, live animals, flaxseed, naval stores and iron, showing that except for fish and meats, the trade system of Great Britain was more favourable to the United States than the French system. Smith pointed out that for the year 1792, America’s exports to Great Britain were $8,260,462 and exports to France were $5,243,543; while America’s imports from Great Britain were $15,285,426 and imports from France were $2,069,348 – showing that America’s commercial interests were far more dependent on Great Britain than on France.
Hamilton had been worried that while only 1/7 of Britain’s commerce was with United States, 3/4 of American trade was with Britain – a trade war with Britain would be far more injurious to the United States.
This debate, continuing the Hamilton-Jefferson battle over the future course of the United States, lasted until February 5th, when the unresolved debate was postponed until March, without passing any of Madison’s resolutions. But now, chilling news began to be received of the Caribbean capture of American vessels made under the British Order-in-council (of November 6th 1793). While Jefferson would have responded with his proposals for reciprocal tariffs, duties and trade restrictions, Hamilton responded differently, with defensive military preparations.
On March 8th, Hamilton wrote to President Washington that:
“the present situation of the United States is undoubtedly critical and demands measures vigorous though prudent. We ought to be in a respectable military posture, because war may come upon us, whether we choose it or not, and because to be in a condition to defend ourselves and annoy any who may attack us will be the best method of securing our peace.”
Hamilton laid out his plan –
“to fortify the principal ports … to raise 20,000 Auxiliary troops … (and) the legislature ought to vest the President of the United States with a power to lay an embargo, partial or general, and to arrest the exportation of commodities, partially or generally.”
On March 10th, a group of senators – King (NY), Ellsworth (CT), and Cabot and Strong (MA) – met and then sent Ellsworth to meet with President Washington to urge him:
“[to] adopt vigorous methods to put the country in a posture of defence … fortifying out principal commercial ports … organizing an auxiliary military force … filling our arsenals”,
and to propose that:
“an envoy extraordinary should be appointed and sent to England to require satisfaction for the loss of our property and to adjust those points which menaced a war between the two countries.”
On March 12th, Congressman Theodore Sedgwick (MA), a ‘Federalist’ supporter of Hamilton, introduced a resolution that there be raised, armed and equipped 15 regiments of auxiliary troops, to consist of 1000 men, rank and file, each; that the President be authorized, if in his judgement the safety or welfare of the United States shall require it, to lay an embargo, generally or particularly, upon ships in the ports or harbour of the United States, and also to prohibit, generally or particularly, the exportation of commodities from the United States.
On March 13th, Madison’s resolutions were again brought up for debate in Congress, but during the debate, ‘Federalist’ Congressman Fisher Ames (MA) stated that:
“we should always say peace to the last extremity; and, if war threatens, strain every sinew to prepare for it. The resolutions say nothing – they say worse than nothing; they are built on partiality for one nation – they have French stamped on the very face of them. If we feel that the English have injured us, let us put the country in a state of defence; the resolutions can do nothing towards this. It is folly to think of regulating a commerce that calls for protection, and to encourage the increase of navigation, when what shipping we have, is in jeopardy.”
The debate ended and Madison’s resolutions were never considered again!
President Washington would sign into law ‘an act to provide for the defence of certain ports and harbours in the United States’ on March 20th, and ‘an act making appropriations for the support of the Military Establishment of the United States for the year 1794’ on March 21st.
Earlier on January 20th, Congress had received a memorial of the people called Quakers, ‘praying that Congress would adopt such measures as in their wisdom may be deemed expedient and effectual for the abolition of the slave trade’. And on January 28th Congress had also received a memorial of the delegates from the several societies formed in different parts of the United States for promoting the abolition of slavery, at their recent meeting, ‘praying that Congress may adopt such measures as shall be the most effectual and expedient for the abolition of the slave trade’.
On March 22nd, President Washington signed into law ‘an act to prohibit the carrying on the slave trade from the United States to any foreign place or country’.
On March 25th, President Washington sent to Congress two letters, received from Fulwar Skipwith, the United States consul to the French isle of Martinique, reporting that up to 250 American vessels, that were carrying cargo to the ports of the French West Indies, had been captured, their cargoes had been seized and sold, and their crews had been stripped of their possessions and their freedom, by the British navy.
President Washington signed into law ‘an act to provide a naval armament’ on March 27th, and ‘an act to provide for the erecting and repairing of arsenals and magazines’ on April 2nd.
On March 26th, the Senate and the House of Representatives resolved ‘that an embargo be laid on all ships and vessels in the ports of the United States, bound to any foreign port or place, for the term of 30 days’; and it was approved by President Washington. However, on March 27th, Congressman Jonathan Dayton (NJ) now submitted a resolution that ‘provision ought to be made, by law, for the sequestration of all the debts due from the citizens of the United States to the subjects of the King of Great Britain.’
News now began to be received of Lord Dorchester’s inflammatory speech of February 10th to the Indians, to further inflame men’s passions.
On March 31st, the House of Representatives began debate on resolutions:
- that ‘effectual measures ought to be adopted to complete the present Military Establishment of the United States’;
- that ‘an additional corps of artillery (800 men) … ought to be raised for garrisoning the fortifications, which are or may be erected, for the defence of the sea coasts’;
- ‘to organize and hold in readiness to march at a moment’s notice, 80,000 effective militia’;
- and ‘that provision ought to be made, by law, for organizing and raising a military force … of 25,000 men’.
On April 4th, President Washington sent to the Senate and to Congress, three letters from Thomas Pinckney, the American ambassador to Great Britain, that the British government had announced another order-in-council of January 8th 1794, to revoke the order-in-council of November 6th 1793, and to substitute new restrictions on trade with the French West Indies.
However, on April 7th, Congressman Abraham Clark (NJ) submitted a resolution that:
“until the government of Great Britain shall cause restitution to be made for all losses and damages sustained by the citizens of the United States from armed vessels … and also until all the posts now held and detained by the King of Great Britain, within the territories of the United States, shall be surrendered and given up, all commercial intercourse between the citizens of the United States and the subjects of Great Britain … shall be prohibited.”
A great debate now started over this non-intercourse resolution on April 9th. It was opposed by Sedgwick who stated:
“that injuries unprovoked and inexcusable had been inflicted by Great Britain on this country, was acknowledged by all … although all combined in opinion that our injuries were great, that they must be redressed, yet no one had suggested that war should precede negotiation.”
On April 14th, Hamilton wrote a detailed analysis of the proposed options to President Washington, that:
“a course of accurate observation has impressed on my mind a full conviction, that there exist in our councils three considerable parties
– one decided for preserving peace by every effort which shall any way consist with the ultimate maintenance of the national honor and rights and disposed to cultivate with all nations a friendly understanding
– another decided for war and resolved to bring it about by every expedient which shall not too directly violate the public opinion
– a third not absolutely desirous of war but solicitous at all events to excite and keep alive irritation and ill humour between the United States and Great Britain, not unwilling in the pursuit of this object to expose the peace of the country to imminent hazards …”
“The views of the first party … favour the following course of conduct – To take effectual measures of military preparation, creating in earnest force and revenue – to vest the President with important powers respecting navigation and commerce for ulterior contingencies – to endeavour by another effort of negotiation confided to hands able to manage it and friendly to the object, to obtain reparation for the wrongs we suffer and a demarkation of a line of conduct to govern in future – to avoid till the issue of that experiment all measures of a nature to occasion a conflict between the motives which might dispose the British Government to do us the justice to which we are intitled and the sense of its own dignity – If that experiment fails then and not till then to resort to reprisals and war …”
“The views of the second party … favour the following courses of conduct – to say and to do every thing which can have a tendency to stir up the passions of the people and beget a disposition favourable to war – to make use of the inflamation which is excited in the community for the purposes of carrying through measures calculated to disgust Great Britain and to render an accommodation impracticable, without humiliation to her, which they do not believe will be submitted to – in fine, to provoke and bring on war by indirect means without declaring it or even avowing the intention; because they know the public mind is not yet prepared for such an extremity and they fear to encounter the direct responsibility of being the authors of a War …”
“The views of the third party lead them to favour the measures of the second – but without a perfect coincidence in the result. They weakly hope that they may hector and vapour with success – that the pride of Great Britain will yield to her interest – and that they may accomplish the object of perpetuating animosity between the two countries without involving War …”
“Preparation for War in such cases contains in it nothing offensive … But acts of reprisal speak a contrary effect … Such are the propositions which have lately appeared in the House of Representatives for the sequestration or arrestation of British Debts – for the cutting off of all intercourse with Great Britain till she shall do certain specific things. If such propositions pass they can only be regarded as provocatives to a Declaration of War by Great Britain.”
Hamilton then advised him:
“to nominate a person, who will have the confidence of those who think peace still within our reach, and who may be thought qualified for the mission as envoy extraordinary to Great Britain … to make a solemn appeal to the justice and good sense of the British Government to avoid if possible an ulterior rupture and adjust the causes of misunderstanding between the two Countries … Mr. Jay is the only man in whose qualifications for success there would be thorough confidence and him whom alone it would be adviseable to send.”
[Note: If only today’s Presidents would listen to advice like this! before starting a war!]
On April 15th, President Washington wrote to Edmund Randolph that:
“My objects are, to prevent a war – if justice can be obtained by fair & strong representation (to be made by a special Envoy) of the injuries which this Country has sustained from G.B. in various ways – To put it in a complete state of military defence. And to provide eventually, such measures as seem to be now pending in Congress for execution, if negotiation, in a reasonable time proves unsuccessful.”
That same day, President Washington met with John Jay, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to ask him to undertake this mission.
On April 16th, President Washington wrote to the Senate and nominated Jay ‘as envoy extraordinary of the United States to his Britannic Majesty’, and Jay’s appointment was confirmed by the Senate on April 19th.
On April 18th, the Senate and the House of Representatives agreed to a resolution that the present embargo be continued until the 25th day of May next; and it was approved and signed by President Washington.
However, on April 18th, the debate was continued in the House of Representatives on the bill to prohibit all commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain. Some congressmen opposed the resolution ‘on the ground that an envoy had been nominated by the executive to negotiate with Great Britain; that the adoption of this resolution, at the present time, would be a bar to those negotiations, an infringement on the right of the executive to negotiate, and an indelicacy towards that department; and that, since it leads to war, other measures should procede its adoption.”
Madison now proposed an amendment to the resolution, to suspend all commercial intercourse – but without specifying on what conditions the intercourse shall be restored (!!!), and it was passed by the House. A bill was now prepared ‘to suspend the importation of certain goods, wares, and merchandise’, the bill was passed by a vote of 58 to 34, and it was then sent to the Senate. In the Senate, a vote on the bill resulted in a tie, 13 to 13, and when Vice President John Adams ‘determined the question’ and voted in the negative, Madison’s bill died.
Jay would depart the United States on May 12th and would arrive in Britain on June 12th.
[next week – chapter 22 – The Battle of Fallen Timbers, August 1794]
*************
For those who may wish to support my continuing work on ‘The Unveiling of Canadian History’, you may purchase my books, that are available as PDFs and Paperback (on Amazon) at the Canadian Patriot Review :
Volume 1 – The Approaching Conflict, 1753 – 1774.
Volume 2 – Forlorn Hope – Quebec and Nova Scotia, and the War for Independence, 1775 – 1785.
And hopefully,
Volume 3 – The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of Ohio, 1786 – 1796, and
Volume 4 – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana – the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804,
may also appear in print, in the near future, while I continue to work on :
Volume 5 – On the Trail of the Treasonous, 1804 – 1814.