by Gerald Therrien
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 3.
The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, 1786 – 1796.
During the American Revolution, when General Washington had asked General Wayne to undertake an extremely perilous enterprise – the storming of Stony Point, Wayne replied : “General, I will storm Hell, if you will only plan it.”
Part 3 – Peace on the Frontier
Chapter 19 – The aborted treaty at Sandusky, August 13th 1793
The American government would now begin their preparations for the important meeting with the western Indians at Sandusky. The British government, through Governor Simcoe and the British Indian Department, would begin their manipulations to delay and abort any meeting, so that they could then begin manipulations so that the Indians would agree to a demand that the British should act as the mediators between the Americans and the Indians!!! And General Wayne must be prepared for either war or peace.
Alexander McKee, British Indian Department agent
On March 2nd 1793, Benjamin Lincoln, Beverley Randolph and Thomas Pickering had been appointed as the United States commissioners to meet with the western Indians at Sandusky. Secretary Knox then issued them their instructions, on April 26th, that:
“you must be well aware of the extreme dislike of the great majority of the citizens of the United States to an Indian war, in almost any event; and with how much satisfaction they would embrace a peace upon terms of justice and humanity …
that the treaty of fort Harmar, made in January 1789, is regarded as having been formed on solid grounds – the principle being that of a fair purchase and sale. The Government considers the Six Nations, who claimed the lands by virtue of former conquests, lying between the Ohio and lake Erie, which were ceded and confirmed to the United States by the said treaty, together with the Wyandots and Delawares, and Ottawas, and other Western Indians, who were the actual occupants of the lands, as the proper owners thereof; that they had a right to convey the said lands to the United States; and that they did accordingly make the said conveyance, with their free consent and full understanding …
You will observe that the space between the tracts of land granted to the particular companies, and the Indian boundary, established by the treaty at fort Harmar, will render it extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to relinquish any lands in the said space, without establishing a cause of perpetual discussions and hostilities between the whites and Indians.”
The next day, on April 27th, Lincoln immediately set out from Philadelphia, by way of New York, to Albany, and along the Mohawk river to Oswego, with the stores and baggage under his care. A few days later, on April 30th, the other two commissioners, Randolph and Pickering, left Philadelphia by way of the Wyoming valley in Pennsylvania, and arrived on May 17th, at Queenstown on the Niagara river.
At the invitation of Governor Simcoe, they took lodgings at his home at Navy Hall, in the village of New Ark, about a mile from the British fort Niagara. The commissioners would receive a letter from Alexander McKee, the British Indian Department agent at Detroit, that advised the commissioners to delay their trip to Sandusky until the end of June because the Indians would be late in returning from their wintering grounds and be unable to assemble themselves before then. Lincoln joined them a week later, arriving at Queenstown with his bateaux from Oswego on May 25th.
On June 3rd, the commissioners sent their interpreter, William Wilson, who had just arrived from Pittsburgh, to fort Erie, ‘to embark for Detroit, whence, if practicable, he was to proceed to the Miami Rapids, where he might gain useful information.’ The next day, the commissions sent Captain Hendricks (along with four of his men, Rev. Heckewelder and Dr. McCoskry, and six Quakers) to embark for Detroit, and instructed him that:
“after discoursing with the hostile Indians about the treaty, and hearing their claims with respect to the boundary, which they propose should be the Ohio, it may be expedient for you to suggest some things for their consideration, as of yourself, in order to discover how far they may be persuaded to depart from their rigid demands.”
On June 6th, the commissioners invited General Chapin, the American superintendent to the Six Nations, who was present at that time at Niagara, to accompany them and to attend the treaty at Sandusky.
On June 7th, the commissioners wrote to Governor Simcoe that they had received an ‘unfounded report … of a Mohawk from Grand river, that Governor Simcoe advised the Indians to make peace, but not to give up any of their lands.’ They added that:
“the views of the United States being thus fair and liberal, the commissioners wish to embrace every means of making them so appear to the Indians, against any contrary suggestions. Among these means, the commissioners consider the presence of some gentlemen of the (British) army to be of consequence: for although the Indians naturally look up to their superintendents as their patrons, yet, the presence of some officers of the army will probably induce them to negotiate with greater confidence on the terms of peace.”
On June 29th, the commissioners proceeded to fort Erie to embark for Sandusky, but had to wait for favourable winds. While they were waiting, on July 5th, Colonel Butler and Captain Brant with a deputation of 50 Indians, arrived from the Miami Rapids and requested to confer with the American commissioners in the presence of Governor Simcoe. When they had all assembled at Simcoe’s residence at Navy Hall on July 7th, Brant wished to speak to the commissioners:
“[to] inform you why we have not assembled at the time and place appointed for holding the treaty with you … because there is so much of the appearance of war in that quarter … and now we request an explanation of these war-like appearances.”
Brant was referring to Wayne’s construction of the road to fort Jefferson for supplying all of the advance posts – ‘for it is but three days’ journey from thence to the Glaize.’
Brant told the commissioners that:
“We have come to speak to you for two reasons: one, because your warriors, being in our neighborhood have prevented our meeting at the appointed place; the other, to know if you are properly authorized to run and establish a new boundary line between the lands of the United States, and of the Indian nations.”
It was later reported that Simcoe had locked the Indian delegates up in a room in his house and warned them against relinquishing any part of their country! Brant told Simcoe that the Shawnees had agreed to give up some land that had been settled by the Americans, but Simcoe replied that he had heard nothing of the sort from McKee and that McKee had written that the Indians were still demanding the Ohio boundary. Simcoe ‘endeavoured more strongly to fix upon Brant’s mind the necessity of that Union, which I trust will in the result will be the safeguard of the Indian Nations and highly beneficial to Great Britain.’
The next day, concerning the boundary line, the commissioners replied to Brant that:
“We answer explicitly that we have that authority. Where this line should run, will be the great subject of discussion at the treaty between you and us; and we sincerely hope and expect, that it may then be fixed to the satisfaction of both parties. Doubtless some concessions must be made on both sides.”
The commissioners also added that:
“Our great chief, General Washington, has strictly forbidden all hostilities against you, until the event of the proposed treaty at Sandusky shall be known. Here is the proclamation of his head warrior, General Wayne, to that effect … The proclamations of the governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania we have here in our hands.”
On August 8th, Wayne would reply to Knox regarding the Indians’ fear of his ‘war-like appearances’ and to answer the ‘idle and fallacious reports of hostile savages’, that:
“[I] have only to regret that those preparatory arrangements should have been occasioned such unnecessary alarms and apprehensions in the minds of the commissioners and the hostile Indians … there was but 10 days rations of flour at fort Jefferson for the aggregate of the army – in place of 60 – & but little more than one days allowance at (fort) St. Clair … I had ordered the Quarter Master General & the contractors to increase their means of transport and they have just got into operation, when I am under the necessity of calling them in, agreeably to your positive orders .”
He added that:
“I shall now beg leave to state the exact additional number of troops to the garrisons for the advanced posts – these garrisons were sanctioned by you:
Fort Hamilton – 200;
Fort St. Clair – 200;
Fort Jefferson – 350;
Total = 750
Total aggregate of these posts = 937
Excess or surplus = 187 men
This sir is that tremendous additional force & army which has occasioned those serious alarms and apprehensions. This was the reinforcement which Colonel Strong had with him on the road cutting party.”
In order to calm any fear among the Indians because of this ‘so-called’ excess of men, Wayne added that:
In obedience to your orders … I have obeyed with promptitude, by ordering General Wilkinson to withdraw the 187 officers and men from the advance post & to send them together with all the waggons teams & pack horses in the Quarter Master General’s & contractors’ employ to this place.”
On July 14th, with the wind favorable, the commissioners set sail for the mouth of the Detroit river – but beyond this point the British commander of the Detroit garrison at fort Lernoult refused to let them advance! They then had to disembark on the north shore of the lake on July 21st and to take quarters at the home of McKee’s deputy, Captain Matthew Elliot. While waiting there, the commissioners wrote to McKee that:
“you may add to our obligations, by sending us the earliest notice when we may expect the Indian nations will arrive at Sandusky, that we may be there at the same time.”
Also on July 14th, Wellbank with his party of Creeks and Cherokees, arrived at the Miami Rapids, and ‘conceiving that his dispatches for your excellency may be of consequence’, the British Commandant at Detroit, Colonel Richard England, sent him by ship to meet with Simcoe at Niagara.
By July 21st, Brant and the Indian delegates had arrived back at the Miami Rapids with the answer of the commissioners, that they were indeed authorized to establish a boundary line between the United States and the Indian nations. While most of the assembled Indian nations had been in favour of peace with the Americans, the Miamies, Shawanese and Delawares were now for war – demanding the Ohio river as the boundary. The Indian nations had somehow changed their minds while Brant was away! McKee had been threatening the Indians that they would not get so much as a needleful of thread from the Americans if they gave in to them.
Brant would write to Simcoe on July 28th, that ‘this great change may be owing to advice from the Creek country.’ Ironically, Wellbank had arrived at Niagara on July 24th and was meeting with Simcoe at the same time as Brant was writing his letter!
Brant was hoping, as part of his plan, that ‘the claim of the Muskingum Boundary if acceded to by the States, would be ample for the Indian Nations, and if refused, would reunite them’, and he wrote to Simcoe that:
“I think it is almost certain that no peace will take place … that the Ohio ought to be the boundary as far up as the Muskingum and this is the line the Confederacy have contended for … but I am afraid the steps they are now taking will have a contrary effect”
and Brant asked for Simcoe ‘to assist us with your advice.’
Simcoe answered that:
“the Indians are the best judges on what terms a peace may be made that shall secure their interests … [and] since the government of the United States have shown a disinclination to concur with the Indian Nations, in requesting of His Majesty, the permitting me to attend as a mediator at Sandusky, it would be highly improper and unreasonable in me to give any opinion relative to the proposed boundaries with which I am not sufficiently acquainted.” [!?!?]
This reply had come after Simcoe and McKee had already sent their proposal of the new boundary to London, and had worked out their strategy to have the British (i.e. Simcoe) become mediators between the Americans and the Indians – because, to become the arbitrators, or mediators, in the American-Indian conflict, and to gain advantages for the empire, was the ultimate British goal.
However, Brant was concerned only with the security of the Indians, and did not trust the British to back them fully in a war, preferring instead a boundary proposal that would at least lead to a meeting with the commissioners, at which time a permanent boundary line and a treaty could be negotiated with the Americans.
The British however did not want the meeting to take place, and wanted the treaty attempt to fail; but at the same time, they needed the Indian confederacy to remain intact, and, with possibly another Indian victory, to make the Americans more amenable to British mediation. After a week of private meetings, that Brant and the Six Nations were not invited to, a new Indian delegation was appointed and sent to the commissioners.
On July 29th, Matthew Elliot arrived with a deputation of upwards of 20 Indians from the Miami Rapids, and the next day, Simon Girty, another British Indian Department agent, read the speech from the Indian council to the American commissioners, that:
“You know very well that the boundary line, which was run between the white people and us, at the treaty of fort Stanwix, was the river Ohio. If you seriously design to make a firm and lasting peace, you will immediately remove all your people from our side of the river. We therefore ask you, are you fully authorized by the United States to continue, and firmly fix on the Ohio river, as the boundary line, between your people and ours?”
The next day, the commissioners replied with the position of their government that:
“[we are] desirous of meeting your nations in full council, without more delay. We have already waited in this province sixty days beyond the time appointed for opening the treaty”,
and they spoke of the previous treaties between the United States and the Indian nations, that ‘at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, twenty-five years ago, the river Ohio was agreed on, as the boundary line between you and the white people of the British colonies’; but, that after the quarrel between Great Britain and the United States was ended by the treaty of Peace, treaties with the Indian nations were held at fort Stanwix, fort McIntosh, fort Finney and at fort Harmar; and that:
“the great council of the States, supposing them satisfactory to the nations treated with, proceeded to dispose of large tracts of land thereby ceded, and a great number of people removed from other parts of the United States, and settled upon them …
that for the reasons here stated to you, it is impossible to make the river Ohio the boundary, between your people and the people of the United States …
The United States wish to have confirmed all the lands ceded to them by the treaty of fort Harmar, and also a small tract of land at the rapids of the Ohio, claimed by General Clarke.”
They added that this would be in exchange for a large sum in money or goods, at once, and a large quantity of goods each year. If all the lands cannot be delivered up to the United States, then they would treat and agree with the Indian nations on a new boundary line, with a generous compensation to be paid at once, and a yearly rent for their benefit forever; with this concession: that while they acknowledge the right of soil to be in the Indian nations, they claim the sole right of purchasing of the Indian nations disposed to sell their lands.
On August 1st, the Indian delegates replied that:
“we are sorry we cannot come to an agreement; the (Ohio river boundary) line has been fixed long ago.”
The commissioners were asked to remain there, while the delegation returned to the Indian council for its answer.
On August 8th, the commissioners received a letter from Captain Hendricks about ‘the disposition of the Indian nations relative to peace and war’, and that ‘it appeared, that all the Indians were for peace, except the Shawanese, Wyandots, Miamies, and Delawares.’
On August 13th, having still not received any answer from the Indian council, the commissioners decided to ‘take measures to obtain that reply, or to ascertain whether we ought any longer to expect it. For this purpose we judge it proper to proceed ourselves to the Miami bay or river, that the necessary communication with the Indians may be easy and expeditious; for it is time that the business of our mission be brought to an issue.’
But the commissioners were refused permission by the British commander to sail to the Miami bay, and were forced to remain at Elliot’s home where, the next day, they sent a message to the Indian nations at the rapids, and another letter to McKee, asking them whether or not there was to be a treaty. At this time, Wellbank had returned to Detroit and dined with the American commissioners on August 13th.
On August 16th the commissioners received a message that was sent on August 13th from the Indian council, and that was signed by the nations of the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Miamies, Ottawas, Chippewas, Senecas of the Glaize, Pattawatamies, Connoys, Munsees, Nantekokies, Mohicans, Messasagoes, the Seven Nations of Canada, and the Creeks and Cherokees. The Six Nations did not sign.
The message stated that:
“we shall be persuaded that you mean to do us justice, if you agree that the Ohio shall remain the boundary line between us. If you will not consent thereto, our meeting will be altogether unnecessary.”
The council’s message also stated that the treaty at fort Harmar with St. Clair, was made with –
“a few chiefs of two or three nations only … who were in no manner authorized to make any grant or cession whatever”
and that:
“we never made any agreement with the King, or with any other nation, that we would give to either the exclusive right of purchasing our lands; and we declare to you, that we consider ourselves free to make any bargain or cession of lands, whenever and to whomever we please.”
Note: All previous treaties between the Americans and the Indian nations agreed, that with regard to all of the territories that were ceded to the United States by the treaty of peace with Great Britain, the Indians acknowledged themselves to be under the protection of the United States and no other sovereign whatsoever. The demand ‘to whomever we please’ meant the Indian nations were rejecting American sovereignty of the Northwest Territory, and claiming their right to sell any of the Indian lands in that territory to the British!
The commissioners determined that this message must have been devised by British Indian agents, and not by the Indians’ council, and so the commissioners replied on August 16th that:
“your answer amounts to a declaration, that you will agree to no other boundary than the Ohio. The negotiation is therefore at an end.”
The commissioners departed and arrived back at fort Erie on August 23rd, where they wrote to Knox that:
“the Indians have refused to make peace. We have not been admitted to an interview with them, except by their deputations.”
They also wrote to General Wayne to inform him that they did not effect a peace.
On September 16th Wayne received a letter from Knox, with the commissioners’ message enclosed, telling him that:
“you are now to judge whether your force will be adequate to make those audacious savages feel our superiority in arms. Every offer has been made to obtain peace by milder terms than the sword – the efforts have failed under circumstances which leave nothing for us to expect but war.”
Wayne answered Knox that he had ordered:
“the Quarter Master General and the contractors to collect their whole force or means of transportation, which were unfortunately widely scattered and deranged just as they had got into operation in consequence of the alarming letter from the commissioners … however that was not the only instance in which British intrigue & policy has been practiced with success upon them during their mission.”
Wayne wrote to Knox on October 3rd that:
“knowing the critical situation of our infant nation, and feeling for the honor and reputation of government – which I will support with my latest breath, you may rest assured that I will not commit the Legion unnecessarily and unless more powerfully supported than I at present have reason to expect, I will content myself by taking strong position advanced of (fort) Jefferson, and by exerting every power and endeavour to protect the frontiers and to secure the posts and army during the winter – or until I am honoured with your further orders.”
Wayne also informed Knox that he had called upon General Scott and the Kentucky militia (which, at present, amounted to 36 guides and 360 mounted volunteers), that part of his army was recovering from influenza and smallpox, and that after leaving the necessary garrisons at the frontier posts, he expected to proceed to fort Jefferson with an army of not more than 2600 men.
Wayne and his legion left their camp, called Hobson’s Choice, situated 1 mile down the Ohio from fort Washington, and on October 13th arrived and encamped at ‘the head of the line’ (where the constructed road had ended, 6 miles north of fort Jefferson) and named it Greene Ville, in honour of General Nathaniel Greene. The whole encampment was enclosed by an enormous stockade.
At the beginning of October, Little Otter and 40 Ottawa warriors had left the Glaize villages to check on reports of Wayne’s advance, arriving in the vicinity of fort Jefferson on October 14th to find the presence of the entire American army. After moving south to Twenty-Nine Mile Creek (7 miles north of fort St. Clair) they lay in ambush for the army’s supply convoy.
Early morning on October 17th, the convoy of 20 wagon-loads of corn was attacked, causing most of the 90 infantry-men to panic and flee, while of those who stood and fought, 15 were killed and 10 were taken prisoner. Although the wagons and corn were later recovered, about 70 horses, that had been removed from the wagons, were either killed or carried off.
On November 4th, Wayne ordered Scott and his 980 Kentucky militia-men to attack a small town of Delawares, near the headwaters of White river, but on receipt of these orders, nearly half of the volunteers deserted back to Kentucky, and the 488 remaining volunteers left on the journey without encountering any Indians before returning to fort Washington on November 14th. Minus the auxiliary militia force, Wayne now had ‘the greatest difficulty which at present presents … that of providing a sufficient escort to secure our convoys of provision and other supplies from insult and disaster, and at the same time to retain a sufficient force in camp to sustain and repel the attacks of the enemy, who appear to be desperate and determined!’
Wayne detached 1 troop of dragoons and 1 company of light infantry to reinforce the 4 companies of infantry, under Colonel Jean Francois Hamtramck, that were escorting the convoy of wagons and pack horses. All ‘public’ horses in the camp, including those belonging to the officers, were to be sent to the Quarter Master General – for convoy duty. The first convoy from fort Washington arrived safely at Greene Ville on December 2nd, and a second convoy with 800 head of cattle arrived on December 22nd. The escorts had not seen a single Indian.
On December 23rd, with 8 companies of infantry and a detachment of artillery-men, Wayne began a rapid march of 23 miles to the site of St. Clair’s defeat in 1791, arriving on Christmas day and the legion pitched their tents on the battle ground, strewn with skeletons and broken muskets.
The next day, all the remains, including 600 skulls, were interred, and a four-blockhouse fortification with a 15-foot stockade was built and named fort Recovery. Three of the field guns, that had been buried by the Indians after the battle, were located, cleaned and remounted inside the fort. Leaving behind a company of riflemen and a company of artillery-men to garrison the new fort, Wayne and his men returned to Greene Ville on December 28th.
[next week – chapter 20 – Dorchester’s Call for War, February 10th 1794]
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For those who may wish to support my continuing work on ‘The Unveiling of Canadian History’, you may purchase my books, that are available as PDFs and Paperback (on Amazon) at the Canadian Patriot Review :
Volume 1 – The Approaching Conflict, 1753 – 1774.
Volume 2 – Forlorn Hope – Quebec and Nova Scotia, and the War for Independence, 1775 – 1785.
And hopefully,
Volume 3 – The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of Ohio, 1786 – 1796, and
Volume 4 – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana – the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804,
may also appear in print, in the near future, while I continue to work on :
Volume 5 – On the Trail of the Treasonous, 1804 – 1814.