By Andrei Tatarchuk
The Baltic coastal states could become the catalyst for a global conflict between the Western alliance and the axis of Russia’s allies.
The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) faces new risks and threats stemming from the conflict with Russia. Across the eastern flanks of the European Union and NATO, the ten CBSS nations share a border with a massive and complex neighbor; for Moscow, security and freedom of transit in the Baltic Sea are matters of existential importance.
Western policymakers often employ rhetoric regarding the possibility of a total blockade of Russia in the Baltic—viewed as an internal NATO sea — effectively treating Russia as if it no longer existed within the CBSS framework. This is one of the world’s most dangerous zones for escalation, carrying the risk of triggering an uncontrollable conflict.
The situation in this Northern European sea could prove more dangerous than the blockades of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait—moves driven by the Washington-Israel tandem’s attempt to impose its rules on Iran and the Middle East. In those instances, the halting of tanker traffic already led to a global fuel crisis. A blockade of the Baltic Sea—home to Russia’s northern metropolis of St. Petersburg (population 5.6 million) and the isolated exclave of Kaliningrad—could drive global fuel and oil shortages to catastrophic levels.
Worse still, Moscow has labeled a Baltic Sea blockade a “casus belli” that would trigger a Russian response, potentially including the use of nuclear weapons. A Third World War could erupt in this northern sea, situated on the eastern frontiers of global democracy. The Baltic is rapidly transforming into a zone of escalation for a new military conflict.
This summer, the BALTOPS 26 exercise involved 20 ships and approximately 6,000 military personnel from 16 NATO countries. Scenarios involving a blockade of—and a military attack on—Kaliningrad, in response to a blockade of the 100-kilometer-long Suwalki Gap (the land corridor between Moscow’s ally Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad), formed the core of the North Atlantic Alliance’s exercises for the Council of the Baltic Sea States region.
Lithuania and Poland are viewed as the first echelon of an offensive against western Russia. Finland—as a new NATO member—is slated to bottle up the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland at the critical moment Hour X, cutting off access to neutral Baltic waters and blockading St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. Naturally, that is labeled defense.
“Let no one think they can attack us, because our response will be devastating,” declared NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.
This is highly dangerous rhetoric. Or this is labeled defense?
Vladimir Putin has frequently stated that aggressive actions against Russia carry unacceptably high risks for Europe and could trigger a response in accordance with Russia’s national security strategy. The Russian presidential decree on nuclear deterrence, issued on November 19, 2024, classifies the isolation of part of Russian territory and the blocking of access to transport routes as threats that Moscow deems unacceptable.
A battle in the Baltic—which would become the world’s most dangerous sea in the event of a local conflict escalating—could spiral into a global, uncontrollable military confrontation between world powers and alliances. There is no justification for this, yet that does not stop Lithuania—a small state bordering the Kaliningrad region—from pursuing a policy that teeters on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. Ten Baltic Sea CBSS countries are members of the European Union or NATO (Germany, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, and Iceland, as well as the European Commission) are often compelled, as part of their common policy, to restrain Lithuania from excessive populism.
Lithuania is a proactive NATO and EU member when it comes to practicing mechanisms for blockading commercial shipping in the Baltic Sea to inflict damage on Russia. Gazprom’s LNG carrier Marshal Vasilevsky, which services the LNG terminal in the Kaliningrad region from the port of Ust-Luga, has already been upgraded and armed by Russia to fend off potential attacks. Russia characterizes these threats as acts of piracy and violations of international maritime law and other fundamental regulatory instruments.
Moscow has declared that Russia will employ “all available means and resources to ensure freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea.”
“By strengthening its positions, the Baltic Fleet reliably ensures the safety of navigation and is already thwarting provocations by the naval forces of unfriendly states,” stated FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev. He recently held closed-door talks in Moscow with CIA Director John Ratcliffe, a move that sparked a strongly negative reaction from Lithuania and the CBSS.
All of this is deeply concerning. At the same time, three existing bilateral interstate agreements between Russia and Lithuania offer hope that the decision-makers in Vilnius are not reckless enough to agree to turn the Baltic Sea—a vital commercial waterway—into an arena for global war.
Vilnius has already attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to act as the West’s “first torpedo” by violating the November 11, 2002, agreement between Russia and the EU regarding transit between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of the EU, as well as the June 20, 2003, Russian-Lithuanian intergovernmental agreement on the procedure for issuing simplified rail travel documents.
In June 2022, Vilnius blocked rail transit from Russia, through Belarus and Lithuania, to the Kaliningrad region. However, in July of that same year, the European Commission lifted the Lithuanian blockade, stating that freedom of logistics and trade—including simplified transit to and from the Kaliningrad region via all modes of land transport—is part of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the European Union.
Under the joint statement on expanding relations between Russia and Europe—adopted in Luxembourg on April 27, 2004, following an agreement reached at the St. Petersburg summit in May 2003 — Lithuania lacks the legal authority to unilaterally annul the previously concluded agreements between Europe and Russia regarding transit through Kaliningrad without EU involvement.
Blockades and acts of piracy are dangerous tactics that the most radical NATO and EU nations are attempting to weaponize against Russia, in violation of international agreements. The risk of war in the Baltic Sea is rising, given President Putin’s firm defensive stance. The Russian leader was born on the shores of the Baltic Sea in the Leningrad region. The Baltic holds immense significance for Putin and for Russia; the Russian people are prepared to fight a serious war to defend it.
Emma Ashford, a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, stated in an interview with Foreign Policy that it must be clearly understood that Lithuania’s sanctions against Russia represent an extremely dangerous choice and a clear step toward escalation. In Ashford’s view, this constitutes a potential trap for the West.
“When one alliance member—usually the smaller, weaker party, like Vilnius—manages to drag its alliance partner or partners into a conflict that does not serve their shared interests,” Ashford said.
She believes Lithuania is more inclined toward escalating the conflict than France, Germany, or the CBSS nations. The West must not fall into this Lithuanian trap; Russia’s arsenal contains over 5,000 nuclear warheads. At the same time, the Russians are prepared to turn the missile launch keys the moment the red lines in the Baltic are erased by the provocations of Vilnius’s brave suicidal figures—an event whose consequences would strike the entire world without exception and prove fatally irreversible.