by Gerald Therrien
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 3.
The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, 1786 – 1796.
During the American Revolution, when General Washington had asked General Wayne to undertake an extremely perilous enterprise – the storming of Stony Point, Wayne replied : “General, I will storm Hell, if you will only plan it.”
Part 3 – Peace on the Frontier
Chapter 20 – Dorchester’s Call for War, February 10th 1794
President Washington still hoped for a meeting with the western Indian nations to try to establish a peace treaty, and he acted to avoid being drawn into a British-planned war with the Six Nations over establishing a town at Presqu’ Isle, and he acted to avoid being drawn into a war with Spain over a French-planned attack on Louisiana. But the British governor of Canada was still preparing for a new Indian war!
President George Washington, by Charles Peale 1795
On September 24th 1793, the 69 year-old Lord Dorchester arrived back at Quebec from London, after a two year absence.
On October 25th, Dorchester wrote to Henry Dundas, the Secretary of State for the Home Department and in charge of the colonies, sending him the messages between the United States commissioners and the western Indians from their failed treaty attempt, along with the letters from McKee and Simcoe showing the split in the Indian confederacy. He was very upset at the present situation because:
[the Americans] “have it in contemplation to occupy the mouth of the Sodus on lake Ontario, and also to form a settlement at Presque Isle on lake Erie, and if permitted will soon establish other posts on this lake nearer to Detroit, in order to distress the Indians and render our communication with them more difficult.”
Dorchester understood that if this occurred, the British would lose their control of the great lakes and soon wouldn’t be able to keep control of their upper posts that were on American territory, which meant they would lose their ability to manipulate the Indians!!!
Simcoe, who had been away in September and October, on a trip from Humber bay to lake Simcoe to Matchetache bay, to view the harbour at Penetanguashin as a potential port for the British navy, would pen a long letter to Dorchester, on November 10th, to explain the situation with the Indians and the results of the council at the Miami Rapids – this was mainly to provide a plausible story of events that could account for any discrepancies he might hear from any reports from Brant against McKee, and to lay all the blame on Brant for the break in the Indian confederacy (i.e. to cover his and McKee’s asses).
On October 10th, an Indian council of the chiefs of the Six Nations was held at Buffaloe Creek, attended by John Butler, the British Indian Department deputy-superintendent, and Israel Chapin, the American Indian Affairs superintendent.
Joseph Brant spoke about the cause of their parting from the proposed meeting at Sandusky, that:
“when the first deputation from the Confederate Indians met the commissioners of the United States, everything seemed to promise a friendly termination of the treaty, but before their return to the council fire, messengers from the Creek nation had arrived there and brought authentic information of the White People having encroached upon that part of the Confederacy. This intelligence at once gave a change to the face of our proceedings and probably was the sole cause of the abrupt termination of the negotiation for peace.”
Brant made another proposal to Chapin, that:
“about 5 years ago we agreed upon a line of demarcation with the United States [the treaty of fort Harmar in January 1789] which you know as the Muskingum, and notwithstanding the various accidents that have occurred since, we still adhere to that boundary. We think the United States will agree to that line, which will show that they act with that sincerity and justice they always profess for Indians. Should they agree to this, we sincerely hope that peace will still take place.”
Brant declined all further meeting unless this boundary was agreed to for the purpose of negotiation.
On February 7th 1794, a council of the Six Nation Indians was held at Buffaloe Creek, with Major Littlehales and officers of the British Indian Department, and with General Chapin of the American Indian Affairs, where they were to hear the reply of the American government to their proposal of last October.
The reply (and warning) from President Washington, written on December 24th, was read to the council that:
“the same principles of moderation and humanity which before dictated the offers to the Indians, and a sincere friendship for the Six Nations, have induced your Father, the President, to consider attentively your propositions for a new boundary, although the lines you mention are considered as liable to considerable objections, yet it hoped, when all difficulties shall be discussed at a treaty or conference, by moderate men with upright views that some agreement may be made which would lead to a general peace; on this ground the President consents that a conference should be held at Venango (fort Franklin), on the fifteenth or middle of next May. It is expected that the chiefs of the Six Nations and Chippawas will attend and the chiefs of all such of the western tribes as the said Six Nations and Chippawas may invite, and if the hostile tribes should think proper to attend they will be well received and treated as people ought to be who are holding friendly treaties, but it cannot be unknown to you, by the late abortive efforts to negotiate, the American Army was restrained from offensive operations against those tribes who appear deaf to the voice of reason and peace, such a conduct will not be observed by the United States again.”
The Indians then removed to their castle, to take it into their private consideration. On February 9th, they met again in council to give Chapin, and President Washington, their reply. Brant again spoke, of the Indians needing more time (both to respond to the Americans, and to await the response of the British) that:
“the speech you have brought us has given us great uneasiness, we are entirely at a loss how to act, we fully expected a direct answer to our proposals of a boundary line, now we are much distressed that you have brought but half an answer to our proceedings. The kindling a council fire at a distant place is what we are not prepared to give you a reply to … in consequence of the importance of your speech containing very weighty matters, we must deliberate seriously upon it, we cannot give you an immediate answer, we must have a general council of all the chiefs … we have two months and a half to consider of your speech, and by that time we will give you a final answer.”
At the same time at Quebec, on February 10th, Dorchester was meeting with ‘the Indians of the seven villages of Lower Canada as deputies from all the nations who were at the Great Council held at the Miamis’, who wished to learn of his views concerning British Indian policy, following his return from London.
Dorchester told them of his plan – for war with the Americans, saying that:
“you reminded me on your part of what passed at the Council Fire held at Quebec just before my departure to England … I remember that they pointed out to me the line of separation which they wished for between them and the States, and with which they would be satisfied and make peace … I flattered myself with the hope that the line proposed in the year Eighty-three, to separate us from the United States, which was immediately broken by themselves as soon as the peace was signed, would have been mended, or a new one drawn in an amicable manner … since my return, I find no appearance of a line remains; and from the manner in which the people of the States push on, and act, and talk on this side, and from what I learn of their conduct towards the sea, I shall not be surprized if we are at war with them in the course of the present year; and if so, a line must then be drawn by the warriors.”
Beginning his preparations for war, on February 17th Dorchester wrote to Simcoe, to occupy the Miami rapids – on American territory !!!, that:
[concerning the] “accounts received by Lieutenant-Colonel England, of Mr. Wayne’s intention to close us up at Detroit … self defence therefore requires we should prevent similar evils from extending further, and that for our own security at the Detroit, we should occupy nearly the same posts on the Miami river which we demolished after the peace … you will therefore order such force from Detroit to the Miamis river as you may judge sufficient for the service … with the artillery requisite for that service.”
On March 25th Simcoe left York and arrived at Grand river to meet with Brant, before he proceeded to Detroit, arriving on April 2nd. Upon arriving at the foot of the Miami Rapids on April 8th, that same day, he received a letter from Carondelet, the Spanish governor of Louisiana.
Carondelet informed him of France’s intention against the colonies of Spain – that General Clark was to raise a corps of 5,000 men to attack the Spanish Illinois at fort New Madrid and fort St. Louis, hoping that with the artillery that they found in these forts, to attack the rest of Louisiana.
Note: Genet had commissioned George Clark to be ‘major-general in the armies of France and commander-in-chief of the revolutionary legions on the Mississippi’. Clark had hoped that this would open the Mississippi river to use by the American frontier settlers, that had been denied by Spain.
Persuaded that the interest of Britain required that the Illinois remained with Spain, and that Britain didn’t want to see the commerce of the Spanish settlements pass between the hands of France or the United States, Carondelet sought to obtain Britain’s absolutely indispensable assistance – to send 500 men to St. Louis, and cause the designs of the enemy to fail.
Simcoe replied that:
“in case the army of the United States now under the command of General Wayne should, as it menaces, invade the British possessions … it is impossible for me to afford the assistance to your post at St. Louis that you require … the co-operation of the forces of the two crowns in this country would be of decisive consequence, should they be compelled into a war by the United States in consequence of the maritime principles they have mutually adopted in respect to France and which from a late speech of Lord Dorchester’s in answer to the Indian nations I think very probable.”
Note: On May 7th at an Indian council at the Miami Rapids, a message was brought from the ‘Spanish Settlements on the Mississippi’, that ‘a large force [from Kentucky] was assembling on the Shawanoe [Cumberland] river to invade our country’ and that ‘we should strike them together’. Also they were told that ‘the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws and Chickasaws … [are] now on their feet with the hatchet now in their hands ready to strike them.’
But, already, on March 24th 1794, President Washington, again fearing that the United States would be drawn into war, issued a proclamation to prohibit and forbid any person to enlist any citizen or to levy troops or to assemble an armed force ‘for the purpose of invading and plundering the territories of a nation at peace with the United States’. This action together with the recall of Genet, caused the Kentucky expedition against New Orleans to be abandoned.
Simcoe now gave instructions for construction of the new fort at the Miami Rapids to the engineer, Lieutenant Pilkington, and instructions to Colonel England at Detroit that 120 regulars of the 24th regiment and 10 artillerists (to man the 4 nine-pound and 4 six-pound cannons) were to be sent to serve as the garrison, and Simcoe returned to Fort Erie on April 27th.
Continuing with his preparations for war, on April 14th, Dorchester wrote to Simcoe that:
“the appearance of hostilities with our neighbours, which the intrigues and influence of France seem to render inevitable, will necessarily draw your attention to the upper part of the river St. Lawrence … a station should be chosen where the craft of all kinds and the stores might receive some protection; this must be within the river as near lake Ontario as circumstances will permit.”
Then, on April 16th, he wrote that:
“Upper Canada should fit out, man, and arm gun boats, particularly for the bay of Quinte, and of the rivers St. Lawrence, Niagara and Detroit … a system of defence by gun boats, to cooperate with your militia might be formed which would afford security to your settlements against predatory parties.”
And again, on April 18th, he wrote that:
“for greater dispatch, I send from hence Lieut. Bryce of the engineers, to see what can be done to put Niagara in a condition to resist an immediate siege. The present hostile appearances rendering it necessary that Upper Canada for its own defence should be enabled to bring forth its full strength on any sudden emergency, I beg to be informed of the force, condition and disposition of your militia … and how they are armed and prepared to resist invasion.”
On April 21st the Six Nations met in council with Colonel Butler and General Chapin to hear their reply to Knox’s proposal to meet at Venango. Brant gave a long speech saying that:
“the answer you have brought us is not according to what we expected … it is not now in our power to accept your invitation.”
Of this meeting, Chapin would write to Knox that:
“I had every reason to suppose, that the Six Nations had fully made up their minds, previous to the meeting of the council, to hold a treaty, agreeable to the wishes of the United States, in order to bring about a general peace. But the inflammatory speech of Lord Dorchester, which was interpreted to them by Colonel Butler, together with the presents heaped on them by the British, on this occasion, induced them to give up that friendly intention.”
Furthering the tensions, on April 8th the state of Pennsylvania had approved ‘an act for laying out a town at Presqu’ Isle’ [Erie] that ‘would promote the settlement of the neighboring country and thereby place the frontiers of Pennsylvania in a safer situation.’ President Washington was worried that this would cause a rupture of the relations with the Six Nations, and advised ‘to suspend, for the present, the establishment at Prequ’ Isle.’
Note: The old French trade route to the forks of the Ohio river, had been to sail from Canada to fort Presque Isle on lake Erie, to proceed across a 12-mile portage to fort Le Boeuf on French creek, down the creek to fort Machault (now, fort Franklin) on the Allegheny river, and down that river to fort Dusquesne (now, fort Pitt) on the Ohio river. The Americans were using this same route – but in reverse, to gain access to the great lakes.
On May 25th, Pennsylvania Governor Mifflin wrote to President Washington that:
“I am apprehensive, indeed, that it is too late to prevent the execution of the measures, which, under the authority of the law of Pennsylvania, were concerted relatively to that object, and of which, I had the honor, regularly, to appraise you. But, ever anxious to promote the views of the general government, and to avoid increasing the dissatisfaction of the Six Nations, or, in any other manner, extending the sphere of Indian hostilities, I shall consider your interposition and request as a sufficient justification for attempting, even at this late period, to arrest the progress of the commissioners in laying out the town of Presqu’ Isle, conformably to those directions of the Legislature, which I could not, on any less authority, venture to supersede.”
On June 18th, the Six Nations again invited General Chapin, along with Mr. Johnson from the British Indian Department, to attend a council at Buffaloe Creek. Captain O’Bail, a Seneca chief, spoke to Chapin about the establishing of a garrison at Presqu’ Isle, that:
“we now expect that you will exert yourself in removing those people off our lands. We know very well what they are come for, and we want them pushed back. We now wish that you and Mr. Johnson would now go together and remove those people back over the line which we have marked out upon the map.”
Chapin agreed to go to Presqu’ Isle for a meeting but warned that:
“I can do no more to those people than to give them my advice. It is not in my power to drive them off.”
From Pennsylvania, Andrew Ellicot and Captain Denny had been sent to fort Franklin – that ‘appeared to be in such a defenceless situation … that we remained there for some time, and employed the troops in rendering it more tenable.’ Then they went to fort Le Boeuf to begin to strengthen the works ‘so as to render it a safe deposit for military and other stores’, when a letter arrived from General Chapin, that he and Mr. Johnson would be at fort Le Boeuf with a deputation from the Six Nations for a meeting on June 26th.
At the meeting, O’Bail repeated his speech from June 18th at Buffaloe creek. Ellicot delivered the reply that:
“the lands which you have requested us to move off have for several years been purchased by the State of Pennsylvania from the Six Nations, and the lines bounding the same were opened and marked with their consent and approbation … your brethren of Pennsylvania have fairly and openly made the purchase of all the lands to which they claim, and have sold those lands to such people as chose to settle and work them; they think it now their duty to protect such settlers from the depredations of all such persons as may attempt to molest them.”
Ellicot later would write to Governor Mifflin that:
“the line described by the Indians, on the map, will take away from the State of Pennsylvania the Cassewago settlement, being part of the purchase of 1784, and the whole of the purchase of 1788. But, with respect to this claim, they can be serious only so far as encouraged by the British agents.”
On July 4th, the delegation reported back to the Six Nation council at Buffaloe creek on their meeting at fort Le Boeuf. O’Bail spoke that:
“we are determined now, as we were before, that the line shall remain … If you do not comply with our request, we shall determine on something else, as we are a free people … the Six Nations has always been able to defend ourselves.”
Acting upon the advice of Chapin, President Washington appointed Timothy Pickering as a commissioner, to be assisted by Chapin, that they were to:
“notify the Six Nations of Indians that their father, the President of the United States is deeply concerned to hear of any dissatisfaction existing in their minds against the United States and therefore invites them to a conference to be held at Canandaigua (on September 15th) … for the purpose of amicably removing all causes of misunderstanding and establishing permanent peace and friendship between the United States and the Six Nations.”
On July 11th, Dorchester wrote to Simcoe that:
“should they [Americans] persevere in forming an establishment on any of the lakes, or near any of our posts, you will send an intelligent person to make a demand by what authority the establishment is ordered, and to require them to desist from such aggressions.”
Dorchester was again worried about the Americans gaining an access to lake Ontario, this time at Sodus. Even if the post was on American territory!!!
Note: In the spring of 1794, Charles Williamson had built a road from Phelpstown to Sodus Point, with a written announcement of plans to survey ‘a town between Salmon Creek and Great Sodus Bay … and mills are to be built at the falls on Salmon Creek.’ Williamson was the agent for Pulteney & Associates, that had purchased and were settling 1.25 million acres, west of the Genesee river, in New York State.
Simcoe then directed Captain Schoedde, commandant of fort Ontario at Oswego, a British fort on American territory, to inform him ‘of the actual settlers who have located themselves in the vicinity of (his) post within the last two years.’ Schoedde reported back on April 15th that ‘the first settler is 10 miles distant … the number of settlers I have not been able to learn, but altogether including the workmen they amount to about 200’ and that, from the Onondago river ‘there is a carrying place of 10 miles to the Big Sodus, which is an excellent harbour fit for the building of vessels’. Schoedde further reported on June 27th that Generals Steuben and Gansevoort ‘are arrived at the salt works of Onondago to lay out fortifications there and at Big Sodus.’
On August 10th, Simcoe sent Lieutenant Sheaffe to Sodus to hand Williamson the protest against that establishment, but Williamson answered that he would pay no attention to it, but prosecute his settlement, the same as if no such paper had been delivered to him; that if any attempt should be made forcibly to prevent him from doing so, that attempt would be repelled by force.
Williamson later wrote letters, sending Simcoe’s protest, to Edmund Randolph, the new Secretary of State, to Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, and to George Clinton, the Governor of New York, to tell them of this British attempt to deny the Americans a port on the great lakes.
[next week – chapter 21 – Jay’s Mission to London, August 19th 1794]
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For those who may wish to support my continuing work on ‘The Unveiling of Canadian History’, you may purchase my books, that are available as PDFs and Paperback (on Amazon) at the Canadian Patriot Review :
Volume 1 – The Approaching Conflict, 1753 – 1774.
Volume 2 – Forlorn Hope – Quebec and Nova Scotia, and the War for Independence, 1775 – 1785.
And hopefully,
Volume 3 – The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of Ohio, 1786 – 1796, and
Volume 4 – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana – the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804,
may also appear in print, in the near future, while I continue to work on :
Volume 5 – On the Trail of the Treasonous, 1804 – 1814.