by Gerald Therrien
The Unveiling of Canadian History, Volume 3.
The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, 1786 – 1796.
During the American Revolution, when General Washington had asked General Wayne to undertake an extremely perilous enterprise – the storming of Stony Point, Wayne replied : “General, I will storm Hell, if you will only plan it.”
Part 3 – Peace on the Frontier
Chapter 16 – The Indian Council at the Glaize, October 8th 1792
After the United States sign a peace treaty with the Potawatomi, Piankashaw, Kaskaskia, Kickapoo, Wea and Eel River nations, the British now tried their hand at undoing it, and at restarting the Indian raids against the Americans. And it was at this time that General Anthony Wayne arrived in the west to take command of the American army, to prepare for the results of the coming council at Sandusky – whether it decided for peace or for war.
General Anthony Wayne, commander of the United States Legion
At the end of the council with the western Indians at Fort Knox on September 27th 1792, General Rufus Putnam also asked the Wabash Indians to ‘send a speech to the Miamis, Delawares, Shawanoes and the other tribes, who have hitherto stopped their ears, and refused to speak with the United States’, and told them that he ‘proposed to send one speech more, requesting them to open a road to some place or other, where we may meet and speak to one another.’ Putnam dispatched William Wells, along with several Eel River Indians as witnesses of the treaty, to travel to the Miami river Indian villages. They departed on October 7th – the same day that the council of the western Indians and the British Indian Department had ended.
Earlier on September 23rd, with all of the invited Indian nations assembled, and with the final arrival of the Six Nations at the Glaize – a Shawnee village at the junction of the Maumee river and the Auglaize river, Alexander McKee was sent a message that the Indians wished for his attendance, and after he and his British Indian department deputies had arrived (with their own private intentions for the Indians) the council began.
On August 30th, Simcoe had written to McKee with his plan:
“to propose to you the hazarding of a measure that seems most likely to effect that Indian boundary, or somewhat like it, which we sketched out when I had the pleasure of seeing you at Montreal. It is to endeavour to impress the Indians, now meeting from the farthest parts of Canada, of themselves to solicit the King’s good offices. It is to be extremely desired that this solicitation should be the result of their own spontaneous reflections. In all cases it will be advisable, after the repeated assurances of our neutrality which we have given to Congress, that there should appear on our part nothing like collusion or any active interference to inspire them with such a sentiment; a suspicion of that tendency would infallibly tend to defeat the accomplishment of our object. It will be also essential that all the Indian tribes bordering on the British possessions, should concur in the solicitation not only as so numerous a confederacy would present to the Americans the appearance of an increased accumulation of hostile force; but also as a consolidation of the Indian territorial claims and rights is requisite to the formation of so extensive a barrier, as we have in contemplation.”
This would be the British scheme for the council of the Shawanoes, Delawares, Connoys, Ottawas, Chipeways, Cherokees, Sawkies, Ouiawatanons, Wyandots, Miamis, Nantokokes, Potawatomas, Creeks, Reynards, the Six Nations of Iroquois, and the Seven Nations of Canada – to convince them to support the boundary line proposal of Lord Dorchester, instead of the peace proposal of President Washington.
After the initial ceremonies, the council began on October 2nd, as the western nations greeted the Six Nations, and Messquakenoe, a Shawnee chief, spoke that:
“when we last met four years ago, it was your advice to us, to be all united and strong as if one nation. We are so. We have followed your advice … but we have not seen you since that time. We suppose you have been constantly trying to do us some good, and that was the reason of your not coming sooner to join us.”
A Six Nations chief would answer that:
“our father, the king, was defeated by the Americans and then made a peace and left us alone – our father then desired us to speak to the Americans for as good a peace as we could get for ourselves. We have been trying to do so in the best manner we could, and we now desire you to do the same and to join us in our best endeavours for that purpose.”
A chief from the Seven Nations of Canada next spoke that:
“as the Americans are now wanting to speak with us, let us put our heads together and join as one nation, and if they do not agree to what we shall determine on: Let us all strike them at once.”
Messquakenoe replied to the Six Nations:
“but you did not speak to the real purpose you come upon to this council fire … when you left your villages to come here, you had a bundle of American speeches under your arm. I now desire you brothers to lay that bundle down here and explain what you have been talking with them these last two years.”
Cow Killer, a Seneca chief, told of the Six Nations’ travel to Philadelphia:
“where they met the 13 states and Washington … Washington asked us what was the cause of the uneasiness of the Western Nations. We told him it was in regard to their lands. He then told us he would satisfy the owners of the lands, if it had been sold by people who were not the real owners thereof; but he wishes for a council with all the nations, for that purpose. He did not say he would give up the lands, but that he would satisfy the Indians for them. That he wanted nothing so much as the friendship of all his brothers the Indians throughout this island. He then desired us to come to you with his speeches, and tell you all he said, and he added that if the forts he had made in the country gave uneasiness he would remove them.”
On October 7th, Messquakenoe, as spokesman for the western Indians, gave the council’s decision, asking the Six Nations of Iroquois that:
“as you were sent here by the Americans to tell us what they say, we now tell you brothers to go the same road you came and inform them [that] the boundary that was made between us, and the English and the Americans when they were one people … was the river Ohio … [and] that the boundary line then fixed on is what we want [i.e. the Fort Stanwix treaty boundary of 1768 !!!]; [that] we do not want compensation; we want a restitution of our lands which he holds under false pretenses; [and that] if the Americans want to make peace with us, let them destroy these forts, and we will meet them next spring at Lower Sandusky, where all the parties who formerly settled the boundary line, must be present.”
The next day, instructions were given to the Six Nations of Iroquois, to ask Simcoe to attend the Sandusky council in the spring, and to bring with him a copy of the treaty that was made at Fort Stanwix.
This demand of the council – that some of the King’s servants should also be present at Sandusky – was Simcoe’s and McKee’s plan for British mediation !!!.
Ironically, McKee had been a British Indian agent involved in the negotiations for the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty, when the British spent £1200 on presents for the Ohio Indians, and £1300 for presents to the Six Nations, and then gave £10,000 in goods and money to the Six Nations for the lands ceded by them by the treaty – the British considered the Ohio country to be a part of the Six Nations territory.
While the British had planned to use the 1768 treaty to stop all frontier settlements of the American colonies into the Ohio country, the Americans, on the other hand, sought to use this treaty to gain an access to the Ohio river and an opening to the west.
And so it would seem, that with the British, the more things change, the more they stay the same.
Although McKee had written Brant to attend the Indian council, because of his ill health, Brant did not arrive at the Glaize until October 8th, where he met in council with the Shawnee and Delaware chief delegates.
When Brant, and those delegates from the Six Nations that had attended the council at the Glaize, returned to fort Niagara, an Indian council was then held on November 16th with the Buffalo creek Indians, along with Colonel Butler, the British Indian agent, and with Israel Chapin Jr. (the son of the American Indian agent) to report on the recent resolves of the Western Indians grand council.
The Americans were invited to send agents to the spring council – ‘men of honesty, not proud land jobbers, but men who love and desire peace … accompanied by some Friend or Quaker’. Butler and Simcoe were again invited to be at the conference between the Indians and the American commissioners, set to begin in the spring, at Sandusky. Simcoe answered the council, that the British would accept their proposal to attend the spring meeting!
After the ending of the Indian council at the Glaize, and having freshly received from McKee their annual supplies and ammunition, Little Turtle (who had led the Indian forces that defeated St. Clair) now led 200 Shawnee and Miami warriors to attack the American frontier forts west of the Ohio! Crossing the Maumee in late October, they arrived at Fort Hamilton on November 3rd and seized 3 soldiers, from whom they learned that a large supply convoy, escorted by 100 Kentucky militiamen, had recently gone to Fort Jefferson and was soon due to return. By attacking the convoys, the Indians hoped to be able to stop the transport of forage and supplies to the frontier posts, and inflict a major setback on the American army.
On the evening of November 5th, the convoy was camped outside of Fort St. Clair, a fort that was constructed earlier that March, half the distance between forts Hamilton and Jefferson. Little Turtle and his warriors had quietly surrounded the convoy, and just before dawn, when Major Adair called in the sentries, they launched their surprise attack. In the dark and confusion, the men had to race for the safety of the fort. In the fighting, the Indians had 2 warriors killed, but the Kentuckians had 6 killed, 5 wounded and 4 missing. Afterwards the Indians took every article of provision they could find that was left in the camp, and then they inflicted the greatest loss on the packhorses – 26 were killed, 10 were wounded, over 40 were captured, and only 23 strays were able to be rounded up later.
Meanwhile, Major General Anthony Wayne, who was camped with his army at Legion Ville, received the report from Knox, of the results of the Indian council at the Glaize, on December 7th, and of the Indian attack upon Adair at Fort Jefferson, on December 28th.
Wayne had earlier arrived at Fort Pitt on June 14th, with only 40 new recruits, a ‘corporal’s command’ of dragoons, and orders from Knox, that ‘of the intention of some of the frontier people to strike at San Dusky … you will, in the name of the President of the United States, positively forbid any such incursion, until the effects of the pacific overtures be known.’
Due to the shortage of men, and not wanting the expense of using the county militias, Wayne kept ‘a strong patrol, superior to insult, constantly passing between here (fort Pitt) and fort Franklin … with orders to chastise any hostile Indians that may be found lurking on our borders.’ With the use of harsh discipline to instill order, cleanliness and proper appearance in his undisciplined and inexperienced men, who were mostly poor and uneducated, he practiced the army incessantly in offensive and defensive drills – using Baron Steuben’s blue Book. And his experiments with improvements in the muskets ‘will cause each musket to prime itself with more certainty in action than the common mode, the eye of the soldier will therefore be constantly upon his enemy, and he can pursue and load in full trot without danger of loosing any part of his powder.’ Wayne saw that ‘if the present overtures of peace are treated with contempt or neglect, we must not suffer another defeat.’
On November 9th, Wayne reported to Knox on his plans for the augmentation of the garrisons for the forts Hamilton, St. Clair and Jefferson, that would be needed as escorts for the provisions required to be in the advance for any ‘effective offensive operation.’ On November 17th Knox replied to Wayne that:
“if a treaty should be held with the said Indians, it would be improper to erect the posts during the treaty – But if they should resolve upon war, the posts ought certainly to be established.”
On November 24th, Knox instructed Wayne, who was preparing to winter his troops, that:
“it will be proper therefore that the troops consider themselves as under orders to move, on a short notice during the winter or early in the spring according to events and circumstances … that at that period it is probable Headquarters will be removed to Fort Washington and a great portion of the troops assembled at that post.”
On December 1st, Knox reiterated to Wayne that:
“it must be clearly understood that no new ground be taken or posts established in the Indian country advanced of Fort Jefferson in the interim between this time and the time fixed upon for treating.”
On November 28th, with almost 800 men, Wayne moved his army away from Fort Pitt, 20 miles down the Ohio river to a new camp near Big Beaver river, to be called Legion Ville. It was here that Wayne received the news of the council at the Glaize and of Little Turtle’s attack on Fort St. Clair.
On December 12th, Knox wrote an answer to the western Indians, agreeing to send commissioners to attend the council at Sandusky, and that:
“we shall prevent any of our parties going into the Indian country, so that you may with your women and children, rest in full security; and we desire, and shall expect, that you call in your warriors, and prevent their going out again. It will be vain to expect peace, while they continue their depredations on the frontiers …
the United States will endeavour to furnish by way of Canada and the lakes, a full supply of provisions during the treaty.”
In line with that offer for provisions, Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, wrote to George Hammond, the British minister to the United States, on December 29th, that:
“from the opinion you have been so obliging as to express that arrangements may probably be made in Upper Canada for procuring a supply, from that quarter, of the Indians, expected to assemble at O’Glaise in the ensuing spring for the purpose of holding a treaty with this government. I have the honor to inform you that I have concluded to send an agent into the territory of Upper Canada to endeavour to effect contracts for the above mentioned supplies; and as you have authorized me to do, shall count on your good offices to facilitate the object of his mission.”
But Governor Simcoe objected to the American offer and refused permission to the American agent, General Hull, to enter Upper Canada !!!
On January 21st 1793, Simcoe wrote to George Hammond at Philadelphia, that:
“I decline the giving permission to agents of the States, to purchase provisions in this colony for the supply of the Indian meeting … Colonel Butler having assured me that it would be indispensably necessary for him and Colonel McKee at all events to have a certain quantity of provisions to entertain the Indians with during the frequent applications which may be expected to be made to them for advice … I am certain that (the Indians) will never suffer the United States to forward a supply thro their country, of which they have hitherto been extremely jealous.”
Simcoe also wrote to McKee on January 23rd that:
“(the Americans) expect that they shall be permitted to furnish what provisions may be wanting from the nearest posts to the Indian country; it is evident therefore that they mean to establish provisions and magazines, under that pretext upon the line, by which they are advancing their posts between Fort Washington and that fortress which the letters intercepted at St. Clair’s defeat mention, they mean to erect at the Miami Rapids; I cannot but fear from these circumstances, that some collusion is intended.”
On February 4th, Simcoe set out on a hurried, 250-mile journey over the frozen wilderness (!!!), from the British fort at Niagara to Detroit – not wanting to wait until spring. At the Ouze (Grand) river, he met Joseph Brant, who accompanied him half-way before returning to attend an Indian council at Buffalo creek. Simcoe and his party of soldiers and Indians continued by way of the La Tranche (Thames) river to meet with McKee at Detroit, regarding the upcoming Indian council at Sandusky with the Americans.
Upon his return, Simcoe would write to Clarke at Quebec on May 31st, of this ‘internal line of communication’, and of:
“rendering the road between Burlington Bay and the River Thames (where it first becomes navigable for bateaux) sufficiently commodious as a military communication, if such shall be the necessity, between Detroit and Niagara.”
And to better protect Detroit from possible attack and to secure the shipping on lake Erie, Simcoe proposed establishing a post (between Long Point and the Grand river) opposite Presque Isle – fearing that:
“Presqu’Isle is immediately to be settled by the State of Pennsylvania and provision is made for its becoming an arsenal, dockyard and fortification whenever such shall be required by the United States.”
Simcoe made his plan based on the thinking that:
“considering therefore all the garrisons & fortifications of Detroit, Niagara & Oswego, as totally inadequate to self-defence or general protection, and that they are especially retained as hostages for performances of an incomplete treaty, rather than from any idea of maintaining dominion over them; that they are the anxious object of jealousy of the government of the United States – a government founded upon the basis of popular opinion and floating with its very breath!”
On January 24th, after being informed by Knox that ‘the motion (in Congress) for the reduction of the troops … failed, twenty for, and thirty-six against it’, Wayne replied with his plan, that:
“I am pleased to find that the good sense of so respectable a majority has defeated the machinations of a restless juncto …
The late decision which shews a stability in our councils, the brilliant and rapid success of the arms of France, together with the complexion of affairs in Ireland & Scotland, affords a favorable & happy opportunity to demand in very pointed terms, the surrender of the posts on the margin of the lakes – agreeably to treaty …
but should they eventually comply with the requisition, we then shall have it in our power to dictate terms to those haughty savages – or to exterminate them at our pleasure. I have already established a strong post at Cussawaga, within forty miles of Presque Isle & two others on the Allegheny at intermediate distances between Fort Franklin & Pittsburgh. Nor shall we have occasion for any more except at Le Boeuf & Presque Isle, the only & best harbour on the west side of lake Erie, between that and Sandusky. I must acknowledge that I have always had a predilection in favor of that route, & in fact I have a strong propensity to attend the next grand council either at the rapids of the Miami, or such other place, on the waters of lake Erie, as the savages may think proper to fix upon, attended with about Twenty-five Hundred Commissioners, properly appointed advancing by this smooth path – leaving Wilkinson to follow upon that which is mirey & bloody, among whom I do not wish to have a single Quaker.”
On March 5th, Knox informed Wayne that:
“a conference will be held with the hostile Indians about the first day of June next, at the lower Sandusky … If after every effort shall be made, it shall be found that peace is unattainable but by the sacrifice of national character and honor, it is to be hoped that the public will have but one mind as to the vigor with which the war shall be pursued.”
On April 13th Know wrote further to Wayne that:
“as the commissioners will be unprotected by troops, their lives will depend upon an absolute restraining of all hostile or offensive operations during the treaty – For most indisputably if any incursions into the Indian country should be made, while the treaty is progressing, the commissioners would be sacrificed – It may therefore be highly proper that you should issue a proclamation informing of the treaty and forbidding all persons whatever from making any irruptions into the Indian Country until the event of the treaty shall be known and permission given for that purpose.”
On April 20th, Knox wrote to Wayne that:
“in case of a successful treaty the commissioners will inform you directly thereof – but that in case of an unsuccessful issue … you are to have everything prepared for vigorous operations and in perfect readiness to move forward from the Ohio …
a strong post (is) to be established at the Miami Village with a large garrison of at least a thousand efficient troops with chains of subordinate posts of communication down the Miami river of lake Erie on the right to as far as the rapids.”
On April 30th, General Wayne and the 1200-man Legion of the United States began the move down the Ohio river from Legion Ville to Fort Washington. Wayne would construct a broad road between the forts Washington, Hamilton, St. Clair and Jefferson – in order to be able to adequately supply the advance posts.
In the midst of all of these government peace initiatives with the hostile Indian nations, the citizens of the United States went to vote in the second election for president – between November 2nd and December 5th 1792. The electoral college met on February 13th 1793, and General Washington, who had reluctantly agreed to run again for president was unanimously elected as president for a second term.
Now, President Washington would hear of a new danger to the United States, coming from their former ally – France.
[next week – chapter 17 – France Declares War on Britain, February 1st 1793]
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For those who may wish to support my continuing work on ‘The Unveiling of Canadian History’, you may purchase my books, that are available as PDFs and Paperback (on Amazon) at the Canadian Patriot Review :
Volume 1 – The Approaching Conflict, 1753 – 1774.
Volume 2 – Forlorn Hope – Quebec and Nova Scotia, and the War for Independence, 1775 – 1785.
And hopefully,
Volume 3 – The Storming of Hell – the War for the Territory Northwest of Ohio, 1786 – 1796, and
Volume 4 – Ireland, Haiti, and Louisiana – the Idea of a Continental Republic, 1797 – 1804,
may also appear in print, in the near future, while I continue to work on :
Volume 5 – On the Trail of the Treasonous, 1804 – 1814.